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SUPREME COURT
MONROE COUNTY

Aumick v. Bane 24
(decided May 18, 1994)

Upon denial of relief under section 158(f) of the Social
Services Law, the petitioners, New York State public assistance
recipients, who resided in the state for less than six months,
challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the Home
Relief public assistance program. They argued that Social
Services Law section 158(f) 25 was a violation of both article
XVII, section 1,26 and article I, section 11,27 of the New York
State Constitution. The court held that the amendment violated
both state constitutional provisions, as well as the Equal

24. 161 Misc. 2d 271, 612 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1994).
25. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 158(f) (McKinney 1994). Section 158(f)
states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the home relief
payment for any person who applied for home relief benefits within six
months of establishing residency' in the state, shall, for the first six
months after establishing residency, be limited to the greater of: (i)
eighty percent of the home relief grant set forth in section one hundred
thirty-one-a of this chapter, or (ii) the standard of payment, if any, that
would apply to the applicant under the laws of the state, if any, in which
he or she resided immediately prior to establishing residency in this
state, provided that in no event shall such amount be greater than one
hundred percent of the home relief grant set forth in section one hundred
thirty-one-a of this chapter ....
Id.
26. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. The provision states: "The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
27. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. The provision states in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof ...

"

Id.
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Protection Clause, 2 8 and fundamental right to travel 29 guaranteed
30
by the Federal Constitution.

The State of New York, in keeping with the state constitutional
mandate to support the needy, provides two major public
assistance programs. 3 1 These programs are known as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children32 and Home Relief.33 The
petitioners' challenge was directed toward an amendment to the
legislative guidelines that regulate the disposition of Home Relief
public assistance. 34 The challenged amendment instituted what
amounted to a durational residency requirement, "resulting in
reduced benefits for those individuals who have been residents
for six months or less and have come from states without
comparable public assistance benefits." 35 Each of the four

petitioners, 36 upon application to the program, had resided in
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause states in
pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
29. See Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901-02
(1986) (affirming that the right to travel throughout the United States, and
reside in any State in the Union, is a fundamental right protected under the
United States Constitution); see also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31
(1969).
30. Aunick, 161 Misc. 2d at 279-80, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72.
31. Id.
32. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 349 (McKinney 1994). This program
provides aid to needy children, and needy families with children, by way of
funding from the federal government in conjunction with state and local
government financial assistance. Aurnick, 161 Misc. 2d at 274, 612 N.Y.S.2d
at 769.
33. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LANV §§ 157-65 (McKinney 1994). This
program is subsidized solely by the State of New York and local counties,
unlike Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter AFDC], and is
designed to provide individuals with needed financial assistance. Aumick, 161
Misc. 2d at 274, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
34. Aumick, 161 Misc. 2d at 274, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
35. Id. Prior to July 1, 1992, the recipient's length of residency in New
York State was irrelevant in determining the amount of public assistance he or
she should receive under the Home Relief program. Id.
36. The court denied the petitioners' application for class action
certification despite evidence to the effect that there were many persons
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New York for less than six months and had come from states that
had public assistance programs that provided lower benefits than
the State of New York. 37
Petitioner, George Aumick, moved to New York from New
Jersey, on July 1, 1992, in order to obtain employment in
Cayuga County and to be nearer to family members. After
participating in alcohol abuse programs, he applied for public
assistance with the Ontario County Department of Social Services
and on November 5, 1992, he was granted Home Relief public
assistance. 38 Petitioner, Beverley Powell, employed as a migrant
farm worker in Florida, moved back to New York in the fall of
1992 to secure work. Due to an injury to her companion, she
could not obtain employment and, thus, upon application in
Ontario County, qualified for Home Relief aid on October 11,
1992. 39 Petitioner, Frank McDivitt, returned to New York, the
state of his birth, from Utah in order to tend to his deceased
grandfather's affairs. Due to an injury that forced him to leave
his place of employment in Utah, he applied, and subsequently
qualified, for Home Relief from Cattaraugus County on July 14,
1992.40 Finally, the petitioner-intervenor, Joyce Aldridge,
returned to New York, the state of her birth, after separating
from her husband in North Carolina. She subsequently qualified
for Home Relief as of April 23, 1993.41 Hence, in accordance
with the durational residency requirement instituted by the
amendment, each petitioner received a reduced Home Relief
benefit up until the time that he or she had resided in New York
for more than six months. 42
similarly situated to petitioners. Id. at 281-82, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 774. The court
claimed that even though "the doctrine of stare decisis will presumably benefit
and protect all petitioners in the purported class... this [c]ourt would be

agreeable to permitting these individuals the status of Petitioner-Intervenors
upon the consent of all parties." Id.
37. Id. at 274-75, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 769-70.
38. Id. at 275, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 770.

39. Id.
40. Id.

41. Id.
42. Id.
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It has been unequivocally stated that the New York State.
Constitution expressly imposes "an affirmative duty to aid the
needy." 43 In Tucker v. Toia,44 the New York Court of Appeals
stated that the adoption of article XVII, section 1 of the State
Constitution "is indicative of a clear intent that State aid to the
needy was deemed to be a fundamental part of the social
contract... [since] the care of the unemployed and their
dependents is in our modem industrial society a permanent
problem of major importance affecting the whole of
society.... "45 The New York Court of Appeals held that an
amendment to Social Services Law section 158(a), which made
home relief benefits for persons under the age of twenty-one who
did not live with a parent or legal guardian contingent on that
person commencing a support proceeding and receiving a
disposition order against any such parent or legal guardian,
violative of section 1 of article XVII of the New York
Constitution. 46 In so finding, the court noted that despite this
mandate that the state provide assistance to the poor, the
Legislature retains discretion as to the manner and means by
which such assistance is to be provided. 47 However, as the Court
held earlier in Lovelace v. Gross,48 this permissible discretion is
balanced by the Legislature's inability to refuse or curtail a
particular group's public assistance benefit once that particular

43. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d
728, 731 (1977).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7, 371 N.E.2d at 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 730-31.
46. Id. at 8, 371 N.E.2d at 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
47. Id. As the court of appeals pointed out:
Although our Constitution provides the Legislature with discretion in
determining the means by which... [the affirmative duty to aid the
needy] is to be effectuated, in determining the amount of aid, and in
classifying recipients and defining the term 'needy,' it unequivocally
prevents the Legislature from simply refusing to aid those whom it has
classified as needy.
Id.
48. 80 N.Y.2d 419, 605 N.E.2d 339, 590 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1992).
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group has been categorically deemed to be needy. 49 The court
determined that this was precisely what the state did with respect
to the petitioners in this case. 50 Each petitioner qualified to
receive benefits through the Home Relief program since each one
fell below the income standard that the state used to define an
applicant as being needy. 51 However, despite the fact that the
petitioners were legitimately classified as needy, the state
withheld payment of full public assistance benefits based solely
on the fact that petitioners, at the time of application, had not
resided in New York State for more than six months. 52 The

court, therefore, held that this durational residency requirement
imposed by the state on the petitioners and on those similarly
situated violated article XVII, section 1 of the State
49. Id. at 424-25, 605 N.E.2d at 341-42, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55. The
court of appeals, in Lovelace, ruled that amending eligibility requirements for
state offered public assistance programs to include the grandparent-deeming
rule (which in determining eligibility operates to impute a certain portion of a
grandparents income to a child who is residing with his or her grandparents)
was within permissible legislative discretion and thus not violative of the State
Constitution. Id. at 426, 605 N.E.2d at 343, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Tile
rationale the court offered was that since the amendment operated "to ascertain
and define the State standard of need" with respect to a particular group, the
grandparent-deeming rule did not violate section 1 of article XVII of the State
Constitution. Id. The New York Court of Appeals pointed out that Lovelace
"differs fundamentally from Tucker v. Tola. .. [since in] Tucker, the
impermissible burden fell on minors already classified under State law as
needy, who were nonetheless compelled to prosecute often lengthy, futile legal
proceedings before they could receive any benefits... [while Lovelace
involved] a challenge to the Legislature's definition of 'needy.'" Id. See Barie
v. Lavine, 40 N.Y.2d 565, 570, 357 N.E.2d 349, 352, 388 N.Y.S.2d 878,
881 (1976) (finding a social services requirement providing for temporary
suspension of benefits to recipients who unjustifiably refuse to accept
employment to be a reasonable legislative determination that such persons were
not needy). But see Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d 247, 402
N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977) (holding that the state's duty, under section 1 of article
XVII of the State Constitution, to provide for needy aged, blind, and disabled
persons does not cease because it has adopted the federal Supplemental
Security Income program).
50. Aumick, 161 Misc. 2d at 277-78, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72.
51. Id. at 274-75, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 769-70.
52. Id. at 278, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72.
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Constitution. 53 Such a requirement created a separate
classification of public assistance recipients based on reasoning
unrelated to need and, hence, the imposition of such a durational
residency requirement was outside the permissible discretion of
the Legislature. 54
The court also addressed the issue of whether such a
requirement violated petitioners equal protection rights as
provided by article I, section 11 of the State Constitution. 55 In
Lee v. Smith,5 6 the New York Court of Appeals held that "under
equal protection requirements... any classification which denies
to one class of needy persons public assistance which is available
to all others, cannot be justified unless it is rationally related to a
legitimate State interest.? 57 The state must first show that it has a
legitimate governmental objective. 5 8 Only then will the means by
which the state attempts to achieve its objective be judged as to
whether it bears a rational relationship to the achievement of such
end. 59 Therefore, although the reduction of the Home Relief
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 278, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
56. 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d 247, 402 N.Y-S.2d 351 (1977).
57. Id. at 460, 373 N.E.2d at 250, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 355 (holding that the
refusal to provide home relief assistance to a group consisting of applicants
who are aged, disabled, or blind, and also receiving federal Supplemental
Security Income, while not denying such relief to other needy groups, is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause as provided in section 11 of article I of
the State Constitution). See Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 446, 373
N.E.2d 238, 243, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347 (1977) (holding that the
implementation of a flat rate grant approach to the provision of shelter costs
did not violate equal protection rights because such approach was rationally
related to the legitimate state interest of optimizing available public assistance
funds).
58. See Lovelace, 80 N.Y.2d at 427, 605 N.E.2d at 343, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
856 (1992) (ruling that the state has a legitimate interest in "allocating limited
public assistance resources to the neediest applicants"); see also Lee, 43
N.Y.2d at 461-62, 373 N.E.2d at 251, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (finding the
state's desires to meet federal requirements in order to qualify for continued
Supplemental Security Income benefits and to reduce administrative costs by
reducing the home relief caseload are both legitimate state interests).
59. See Lovelace, 80 N.Y.2d at 427, 605 N.E.2d at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
857 (applying the rational relationship test in holding that the grandparent-
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caseload was found to be a legitimate state objective, the court
held that "the accomplishment of such result by arbitrarily
denying fall benefits to one class of person," by way of a
durational residency requirement, "cannot be justified as
rationally related to a legitimate State interest." 60 Therefore, the
court, agreed with the petitioners' claims that this disparate
treatment violated the equal protection guarantee of the State
Constitution.6 1
deeming rule, added to home relief eligibility requirements, was rationally
related to the legitimate goal of allocating limited relief funds to the neediest
persons because not to do so could lead to the "complete erosion" of other
public assistance programs); see alsoLee, 43 N.Y.2d at 461-62, 373 N.E.2d at
251, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (applying the rational relationship test in holding
that denial of public assistance benefits to the aged, disabled, or blind
applicants who receive federal public assistance while not denying home relief
to other needy individuals who receive other sources of relief is not a rationally
related means to achieve an otherwise legitimate state interest of reducing the
home relief caseload).
60. Aumick, 161 Misc. 2d at 278, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
61. Id. In addition, three of the four petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the procedural requirements of the statutory amendment by
claiming that the failure to provide notice of reduced benefits violated their due
process rights. Id. at 280, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 773. However, in finding no due
process violation, the court reasoned that even had the petitioners been notified
that their benefits would be reduced in accordance with the durational
residency requirement, there existed no administrative remedy to challenge the
reduction. Id. The court distinguished the petitioners' situations from those
cases where reduction or termination of benefits came after recipients had"
previously been receiving them for some time. Id. The court drew a
comparison between the present situation and the situation that arose in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) where, in response to a challenge by
New York City residents to the constitutionality of notice procedures instituted
by the City for terminating AFDC and Home Relief public assistance, the
Supreme Court held that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing was required to
provide the welfare recipients with procedural due process. Likewise, the court
also distinguished petitioners' situations from those cases involving failure to
notify applicants of the availability of certain public assistance benefits. The
court contrasts the present situation with that in Gonzalez v. Blum, 127 Misc.
2d 558, 486 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1985), aft'd, 96
A.D.2d 1091, 467 N.Y.S.2d 58 (2d Dep't 1983), where, in response to public
assistance recipients allegation that New York State Department of Social
Services failed to inform them of pre-investigative grants for those in
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The court also found the state's creation of a durational
residency requirement for Home Relief applicants to be violative
of the United States Constitution. 62 As the Aumick court stated,

"the Supreme Court of the United States has frequently declared
durational residency requirements unconstitutional as violative of
our right to travel." 63 The Supreme Court has reiterated on

numerous occasions that "[fireedom to travel throughout the
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution. " 64 This fundamental right is directly implicated by
state action which creates a classification that penalizes the
exercise of the right to travel. 65 While the precise textual source
of the right to travel has been elusive.6 6 the Court has observed
that it "is clear from our cases [that] the right to travel achieves
its most forceful expression in the context of equal protection
analysis." 67 Consequently, when the state creates two
classifications between otherwise needy residents based solely on
the length of their residency, equal protection concerns are
raised. 68 Moreover, "[w]henever a state law infringes a
immediate need, the court held that the state is required to inform applicants of
available welfare benefits in order to comport with due process guarantees.
62. Aunick, 161 Misc. 2d at 278, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
63. Id.
64. Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)). See Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972).
65. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903.
66. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71 (1982) (assigning the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV, section 2, of the United States
Constitution as the source of the right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (suggesting the source of the fundamental right to
travel to be the very federal structure that the Constitution sought to create);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74, 177-78 (1941) (alternately
declaring that the right to travel could be said to emanate from the Commerce
Clause and/or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
67. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 67 (Brenfian, J., concurring).
68. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904. The Court went on to state that "[tihe
analysis in... these cases.., is informed by the same guiding principle - the
right to migrate protects residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from
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constitutionally protected right," such as the right to travel, the
Court "undertake[s] intensified equal protection scrutiny of that
law." ' 69 This intensified scrutiny requires the state to come forth

with a compelling justification for its actions if such action is
found to penalize, by way of burdening, those persons who seek
70
to exercise their right to travel.
Thus, consistent with the federal courts, this court determined
that the six month residency requirement clearly penalized the
exercise of the right to travel. 7 1 Given the burden imposed on
this fundamental right, the state failed to meet the strict scrutiny
test. 7 2 As the court stated, "'the conservation of the taxpayers'

purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a
durational residency requirement.' 73 Therefore, any law
deterring persons from migrating into another state is
constitutionally impermissible. 7 4 The reduction of Home Relief

benefits to one class of recipients, due to their length of residence
in the state, violated both the right to travel and the equal

protection guarantees of the United States Constitution when such
75
reduction was not imposed on other similarly situated classes.
being treated differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from
other similarly situated residents."
69. Id.
70. Id. at 909. (stating that the denial of civil service employment
preference to veterans who were not residents of the State upon entering
military service operated to penalize such persons for exercising or more
specifically not exercising their rights to migrate); Memoriad Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974) (finding that the denial of free
non emergency medical care to an indigent resident based on a durational
residency requirement operated to burden such resident's right to travel);
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627 (stating that the denial of state public assistance
based on a one year durational residency requirement penalized appellee's
fundamental right to travel).
71. Aumick, 161 Misc. 2d at 279, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting MemorialHosp., 415 U.S. at 263).
74. Id.
75. Id. Likewise, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, when faced with a
similar situation involving a six month durational residency requirement
operating to reduce public assistance benefits, also found such action to be
constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 773. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487
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While the New York State Constitution mandates that the state
provide for the needy, federal public assistance programs are
implemented via statutory authority. 76 In providing such public
assistance to those categorically defined as needy, the State
Legislature cannot arbitrarily create a classification based on
criteria unrelated to need. In creating classifications, the State
Legislature may not abridge its residents equal protection rights
by imposing requirements on one class through means not
rationally related to a legitimate goal. Alternately, the equal
protection right of the Federal Constitution requires the state to
overcome strict scrutiny when instituting regulations that abridge
fundamental rights such as the right to travel.

SUPREME COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
77

Pastore v. Sabo1
(decided March 9, 1994)
Petitioners, as applicants for Medicaid, sought declaratory and
injunctive relief 78 in order to receive temporary medical
assistance to meet their "immediate medical needs" while
awaiting a decision on their Medicaid applications. 79 However,
N.W.2d 896, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aft'd, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 902 (1994).
76. See, e.g., 49 Stat. 627 (as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-09). The
Social Security Act of 1935 established the program Aid to Families with
Dependent Children.
77. 160 Misc. 2d 983, 611 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1994).
78. The petitioners also sought an award of attorneys' fees. Id. at 994, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 762. However, the court denied this request based on the
reasoning that CPLR article 86, a provision which shifts to the state the
obligation to pay counsel fees, is restricted and narrowly interpreted. Id.
(citing Peck v. State Div. of Hous., 188 A.D.2d 327, 590 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1st
Dep't 1992)).
79. Id. at 985, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 756. Robert Pastore was the original
petitioner. In separate motions, Mr. and Mrs. Timmes for themselves, and on
behalf of their granddaughter Lisa Cannalonga, and Belva Frank and her
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